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A b stra c t
Various ß e ld  studies and experimental simulations demonstrated that causal 
reasoning increases after unexpected as well as after unpleasant events. However, 
unpleasant events are seen as less likely than pleasant ones in everyday life. 
Accordingly, the subjective probability o f  the event and its hedonic quality were 
naturally confounded in these studies. To isolate the contribution o f  both 
determinants, the subjective probability and the valence o f  an event were 
independently manipulated in a laboratory experiment. Subjects completed an 
ostensible 'professional skills te s t ' and received either success or failure feedback in 
relation to a criterion set by the experimenter. The subjective probability o f  success 
was varied by informing subjects about the distribution o f  success and failure in a 
comparable population (either 23 per cent or 77 per cent were said to meet the 
criterion). The results indicate a pronounced valence effect: The intensity o f  causal 
reasoning and the number o f  possible reasons reported fo r  the outcome was greater 
after negative than after positive feedback, independent o f  the a priori probability o f  
the outcome. No evidence fo r  an increäse in causal explanations after unexpected, as 
compared to expected, events was pbtained. Several mediating processes are 
discussed.
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IN TRO D U CTIO N
Most a ttribution  theories share the basic assum ption that individuals are m otivated lo 
attribute underlying reasons to  perceived events (e.g. Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973). This 
assum ption is reflected in a ttribu tion  research, which seems to imply that the 
attribution of causality is the predom inant form of cognitive activity. The validity of 
this assum ption, however, is disputed. Manis (1977), for example, questions the claim 
that persons are preoccupied with the search for causa! explanations most of their 
time. If they are not, the conditions under which causal thinking occurs in everyday 
life need to  be circumscribed in more detail.
In previous research, the determ inants of causal reasoning have been investigated 
with various non-responsive m ethods, including the content analysis o f written 
m aterial or o f subjects’ free verbalizations in experimental simulations. In other 
studies, researchers tried to draw conclusions about the occurrence of causal reasoning 
from the observation of related cognitive processes, such as inform ation search and 
memory (for a review see Weiner, 1985). The results o f these studies consistently 
indicate that the extent o f causal reasoning is determined by two factors (in addition to 
the less interesting case of explicit ‘why’-questions), namely the expectedness of the 
event and its affective valence (Hastie, 1984; Weiner, 1985). Causal reasoning is more 
likely to be elicited by negative rather than positive, and by unexpected rather than 
expected events. Additive effects of both factors (where the highest degree of causal 
thinking is obtained after negative and  unexpected events, and the lowest degree of 
causal reasoning after positive and expected events) as well as occasional interaction 
effects have been observed. Abele (1986), for example, found in an experimental 
sim ulation that negative valence increased the extent of causal reasoning especially for 
events of high probability, but less so for events of low probability.
Several processes may contribute to  these findings. In the framework of schema 
theory (c f  Taylor and Crocker, 1981; Schwarz, 1985 for reviews), one might argue that 
events are understood lo the extent that they are consistent with higher-order 
knowledgc-stmctures (schemata). In such cases, a search for causal explanations 
seems to be unnecessary. R ather, a person should only engage in causal thinking if an 
event that he o r  she experiences is inconsistent with the available schem ata. In this 
fram ework, unexpectedness of an event can be conceptualized as a special case of 
schema-inconsistency.
Similarly, W einer (1985) assumes that unexpected events trigger some kind of 
cognitive orienting response. The deviation from  a norm  (e.g. an expectancy) needs to 
be explained, whereas events that are consistent with an expectancy have been 
frequently analysed in the past for their possible causes, so that the expense of 
attributional activities can be avoided.
In addition, negative events and their accom panying negative affective states may 
instigate causal reasoning beca'use individuals are motivated to avoid unpleasant states 
(Weiner, 1985; Schwarz, 1987). To do so, they need adequate knowledge about the 
potential causes of negative events. M oreover, searching explanations for negative 
events may serve the purpose of reducing the aversive affect by finding external and 
self-irrelevant causes for the initially unpleasant event (Wyer and Carlslon, 1979). 
Sim ilarly, action identification theory (W egner and Vallacher, 1986) predicts that 
persons who experience negative affect during or after completion of an action may 
consider the action in m ore detail at a lower level of abstraction (Vallacher and 
Wegner, 1987) and may think about possible reasons for the action’s outcom e.
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In addition, the process of causal reasoning itself may reduce the intensity of an 
emotion (Schwarz, 1987). Explaining why an event occurred prom otes a dissociation 
of affect tha t has been experimentally dem onstrated (e.g. Speism an, Lazarus, 
M ordkoff and Davison, 1964; Leyens, Cisneros and Hossay, 1976; Strack, Schwarz 
and Gschneidinger, 1985) as well as applied in various therapeutic approaches (Frank, 
1982).
Il must be taken into account, however, that an event's affective valence and 
subjective probability are usually confounded; that is, unpleasant events are less likely 
than pleasant events. Let us consider, for example, the outcome of an examination: 
Failing an exam is more unpleasant, but also occurs less often than passing an exam. 
This natural confounding of ihe two factors ‘subjective probability’ and ‘affective 
valence' renders it difficult to  isolate their relative impact on causal reasoning. Indirect 
evidence for the natural confounding o f expected ness and valence is provided by a 
mela-analysis o i mood studies that revealed that most respondents report being in a 
happy m ood most of the lime (Bless and Schwarz, 1984). This result suggests that 
events which elicit positive moods may appear to be the rule, whereas events which 
elicit negative feelings represent exceptions from the rule (Som m ers, 1984; Schwarz 
and Clore, 1983; Schwarz, 1987).
This leads to an ambiguity in the interpretation of research findings that suggest 
m ood-dependent increases or decreases of causal and analytic thinking (e.g. Isen, 
Means, Patrick and Nowicki, 1982; Abeie, 1986): Do persons in a negative mood think 
more analytically, only because the event that made them feel sad was unexpected to 
them? Can bad moods and negative events, therefore, be conceptualized as 
subcaiegories o f unexpected events, as Hastie (1984) proposed? Or is there a genuine 
impact of m oods on causal thinking, independent of their expeciedness?
This issue cannot be settled on the basis of the available empirical evidence, because 
in field studies, the natural confounding of the two variables has to be put up with, and 
in experim ental simulations or role-plays, the mood-relevant events are produced by 
the subjects themselves. In order to disentangle the effects of the affective valence and 
subjective probability of an event on subsequent attributions, the tw o variables were 
independently m anipulated in a 2 * 2-factorial laboratory experim ent. Subjects were 
exposed to  an event that was either pleasant or unpleasant, and either expected or 
unexpected. Affective valence was operationalized as success versus failure in an 
ability test, and high versus low expectancies were induced by presenting corres­
ponding distributions of success and failure in a comparable population before the test 
was adm inistered. The central dependent variable was the extent of causal reasoning 
after receiving the test result.
If subjective probability is the central determ inant o f causal a ttribution , unexpected 
events should always elicit explanations, and causal reasoning should increase after 
unexpected success as well as after unexpected failure. If, on the other hand, there is a 
genuine influence o f an event’s affective valence on causal attribution , failure should 
elicit more causal reasoning than success* over and above the effects of expectedness.
M E TH O D
Subjects and procedure
Forty-three students of the University of M annheim were recruited as paid subjects for 
a study on the improvement of professional skills tests. The experim ent was conducted
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in single sessions. Subjects were told that they would be administered 10 items of a 
professional skills test, and that after working on this task they were to answer various 
questions about the testing situation. The personal relevance of the task was enhanced 
by telling subjects that ihe test from which the items were taken was a valid predictor 
of professional success. The alleged ‘professional skills test’ items were taken from the 
‘S tandard1 and ‘Advanced Progressive M atrices'(R aven, 1958, I962)1.
Independent variables and m anipulation check
To assure that the task was well understood, the experim enter provided detailed 
explanations o f two examples. Subsequently, subjects were informed that they could 
win a chocolate bar if they performed successfully. Success was defined as having 
solved at least seven of the 10 items. On a table in one corner of the laboratory, the 
subjects could see several chocolate bars, which had proved to be effective incentives 
in previous studies (M iinkel, S irack and Schwarz, 1987). This additional reward was 
introduced to provide a salient mark of success, which would facilitate an expectancy- 
independent subjective definition of success.
To m anipulate the expectancy of success, subjects were either informed that 77 per 
cent (high expectancy conditions) or 23 per cent (low expectancy conditions) of the 
previous student subjects had reached the criterion. Before subjects were administered 
the test items, the effectiveness o f the expectancy m anipulation was checked. The 
question read: ‘Do you think that you will succeed in solving seven or more of the 10 
items correctly?’ The answer had to be given on a scale ranging from 1 (‘no, certainly 
nol*) to 11 (‘yes, quite certainly').
After com pletion of this m anipulation check, the experim enter presented the 10 lest 
items and made sure that subjects kept the time limit of 60 seconds per item. Subjects 
were forced to  choose a response alternative within this time limit and were told that 
one may ‘often guess the correct answer w ithout being able to  fully explain the 
solution principle. So please do make a choice on each item even if you are not certain 
about the correct solution’. This instruction was necessary to ascertain the credibility 
of the feedback.
When subjects had made their choices for all 10 items, the experimenter took the 
response sheet and went to a different table, ostensibly to  check the test result. Up to 
this point, the experim enter was blind with respect to  the success versus failure 
condition. W hether the subject would receive positive or negative feedback was 
determined by a card that the experim enter look from  a pile invisible to the subjects. 
In the success condition, the subject was told that he or she had eight items correct, 
and the experim enter let him or her choose one of the chocolate bars. In the failure 
condition, the subject was informed that he or she had only four items correct and 
therefore had unfortunately failed to  win a chocolate bar. The difficulty of the items 
and the time limit had been chosen so that the success as well as the failure feedback 
were highly credible. An inform al interview at the end of the experim ent revealed that 
only one subject was suspicious about the validity o f the feedback. The data of this 
subject were excluded from  the analysis.
' it e m  num bers (in  th e  order o f  adm in istration) in the failure con d ition s  were: A dvanced Progressive  
M atrices (A P M ) S el II: 2 4 ,2 1 , 17; Standard Progressive M atrices (S P M ) Set E: 12; A PM Set [I: 28. 13, 16, 
23, 26 , 19. In ih e  su ccess cond itions: A P M  S e l II: 13, 14, 24; SP M  S e l E: 9; A P M  Set II; 17, 23, 26, 20 , 16,
15.
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Before the dependent variables were assessed, the influence of ihe success versus 
failure feedback on subjects’ affective slaie was assessed with the question: 'H ow  do 
you feel ai this very mom ent?’ The response scale ranged from I (‘very b ad 1) to  11 
(‘very good1).
Dependent variables
Subsequently, subjects were asked to answer a series of questions that were ostensibly 
designed to assess how he or she experienced the testing situation . All questions 
pertained to the extent and intensity o f  causal reasoning. The first tw o questions were 
phrased in an open-answer format. The first question pertained to  the testing situation 
in general, the second one specifically to  the test result. Finally, the intensity of causal 
reasoning was directly assessed in a closed response format. Thus, care was taken to 
present first open ended, non-responsive questions and to  successively narrow  the 
focus on the lest result and finally on causal reasoning.
Thought listings
Subjects were first instructed to th ink about the testing situation and to write down 
everything that came to mind. They were provided a legal sized sheet with 18 lines for 
this task. There was no lime limit. After this thought listing, subjects were instructed to 
think about their test result and to write down whatever came to mind about this 
aspect. In all other respects, the procedure was identical to the first thought listing. 
Thus, the focus was narrowed on resuli-related cognitions, but causal thinking was not 
yei explicitly mentioned.
After completion of the thought listings, subjects were instructed to read through 
each listing and to  specify how many causal explanations of ihe test result it contained.
Content analysis
The interpretation of subjects' own counting o f causal explanations is somewhat 
problematic, because subjects might not have produced any ‘spontaneous’ causal 
explanations but might rather have generated reasons after being questioned to check 
their thought listings, which may have caused them to re-interpret the listings in terms 
of causal explanations. Therefore, both thought listings were also content-analysed by 
two independent judges for the to ial num ber o f words and  sentences they contained, 
ihe num ber of causal explanations and the num ber of sentences m entioning positive or 
negative feelings2. The mean in ter-rater correspondence for the num ber of causal 
explanations and the number of feelings mentioned was r = 0.65 and r = 0.73, 
respectively. For those cases about which the judges disagreed, the arithm etic mean of 
their ratings was computed for further analyses. A com parison of the total numbers of 
sentences and words that the judges had counted revealed perfect inter-judge 
correspondence.
i
’ The fo llow in g  instruction  was given < 0  the ju dges: ‘J. C ou n t the num ber o f  sen tences and the num ber o f  
w ord s on each thought listing. 2. Read the listin g  carefully and check the num ber o f  causal explanations for 
the lesl result it contain s 3. Read the listing carefully and check the num ber o f  statem ents that express 
positive  feelings (.like jo y , pleasure, relief, happiness, positive  su rp rise  etc.). 4. Read ihe listing carefully and 
check the num ber or statem ents that express negative feelings (like sadness, anger, depression , u n h a p p in e ss , 
negative surprise etc.)'. B oth  judges analysed the w hole corpus o f  response sheets.
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Intensityjudgments
Finally, subjects were directly asked to rale the intensity of causal reasoning: ‘How 
intensely did you think about the reasons for your test result? 'The answers were to be 
reported on a scale ranging from 1 (‘not intensely al all’) to 11 (‘very intensely’).
RESULTS
M anipulation checks
As expecied, the presentation of population norm s affected the subjective probability 
to reach the criterion set by the experimenter. Subjects in the ‘high expectancy '(77 per 
cent success) condition reported a higher expectancy o f success (M  = 7.3) than subjects 
in the ‘low expectancy’ (23 per cent success) condition (A/= 5.9), r(40) = 1.91,/? <  0.04, 
one-tailed. To test the effectiveness of the m anipulation of success and failure, the 
answers to the question, ‘H ow do you feel at this very m om ent?’, were subjected to a 2 
(success versus failure) * 2 (high versus low expectancy) factorial analysis of variance. 
This analysis revealed only a main effect of the ‘success/failure’ m anipulation: As 
expecied, subjects in the success conditions fell significantly betler (M  = 8.5) than 
subjects in the failure conditions (A/ = 7.1), /T[l, 38) = 8.15,/? < 0 .0 1 . The expected ness 
o f  Jhe result did not affect subjects’ affective stale, F<  1 for both the expectancy main 
effect and the two-way interaction.
Figure I. M ean perccntages of causal attributions in su b jects’ cogn ition s abou t the testing situation  (left) 
and the test result (right) as a function  o f  valencc and subjective probability: Subjects' self-ratings (above); 
results o f  content analysis (below ). S  -  success, F  = failure
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Thus, the m anipulation checks revealed that the realization of different levels of 
subjective probability and affective valence was successful. It might be argued, 
however, that subjects in the failure conditions still scored above the scale midpoint on 
the question of affective state and thus felt reasonably well. On the other hand, there is 
evidence that even depressive subjects do not score far below the scale midpoint on 
questions o f  present m ood (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz and Strack, 1988), which implies 
that there may be a genera! tendency to present oneself favourably on questions of this 
kind. Even if one is in doubt whether the failure condition induced categorically 
negative mood, there is a significant mood difference between success and failure 
conditions, so that subsequent Tesults can be interpreted on the basis of a relative 
mood difference.
Though! listings
The percentages o f causal explanations in relation to  the total number of statements in 
the thought listings about the testing situation and the test result are shown in the 
upper part of Figure 1.
The 2 (success versus failure) * 2 (high versus low expectancy) factorial analyses of 
variance revealed that subjects’ reported thoughts about the testing situation as well as 
about the test result contained more causal explanations when the subjects had 
experienced a negative event (failure; ATs = 35 per cent and 21 per cent, respectively) 
than when they had experienced a positive event (success: A/’s = 12 percen t and 5 per 
cent, respectively). The corresponding main effects of ‘affective valence’ are 
statistically significant for both thought listings, F s  (1, 38) = 7.38 and 6.56, p ’s < 0 .0 2 .
In addition to  this main effect, an unexpected statistical trend emerged in the First 
thought listing, pertaining to the testing situation in general: Subjects tended to 
generate more causal explanations after an expected (M -  32 per cent) than after an 
unexpected event (M  = 16 per cent), F (l, 38) = 3.11, p  <  0.09. This surprising result 
may be due to the fact that, in the high expectancy conditions, the experim enter had 
already presented an ‘explanation’ by telling subjects the population norms. This 
explanation may have been easily accessible in these conditions and may have 
increased the num ber of causal explanations.
Content analysis
The results of the ratings of two independent judges, again subjected to 2 (success 
versus failure) * 2 (high versus low expectancy) factorial analyses of variance, parallel 
the subjects' own ratings. The percentages of causal explanations are displayed in the 
lower part of Figure 1. In the judges’ as well as the subjects’ judgm ent, the negative 
event elicited more causal explanations (M  = 30 per cent for thoughts on the testing 
situation, and A/ =18 per cent for thoughts on the test result) than the positive event 
{M= 14 per cent and 7 percen t, respectively), f l[1 ,37) = 5.003,/? <  0.04, and F (l, 38) = 
5.88, p  <  0.03. No main effect fpr expecledness and no two-way interaction was 
obtained, all p 's >  0.25.
In the first thought listing, pertaining to the testing situation, the percentages of 
references to  positive or negative feelings were unaffected by experimental conditions,
‘O ne thought listin g  abou t the testing situation  was unreadable, so there were on ly  41 valid  coses for  this 
part o f  the analysis.
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all p ’s > 0.15. In the second thought listing, pertaining to the test result, main effects of 
affective valence were obtained. After success, subjects' thought listings contained 
more references to positive (M  = 0.66) and fewer references to negative (M  -  0.11) 
feelings than after failure (M  = 0.05 and M - 0.40, respectively), fl[l, 38) = 20.58, 
p  <  0.0005. and fl[l, 38) = 4.72, p  <  0.04. No other main or interaction effects 
emerged, all p 's  >  0.15. These results provide further evidence for a change of affective 
state in reaction to success and failure.
Finally, the number of sentences and words in both thought listings were unaffected 
by experimental conditions, all p ’s >  0.10.
EKP1CTTEU UMEHPBCTlfU
Figure 2 Subjects' m ean ratings o f intensity o f causal reasoning as a function or valence and subjective 
probability (eleven-poini scale ranging from  1. 'not intensely at all*, lo  11, 'very intensely"). S = success. F = 
failure
Intensity of causal reasoning
Subjects’ self-ratings o f the intensity of their causal reasoning are consistent with the 
results reported so far.
As can be seen in Figure 2, subjects in the failure conditions reported a greater 
intensity of causal reasoning {M  - 7.3) than subjects in the success conditions (M  -  5.4. 
F[ 1, 38) = 4.39, p  <  0.05. Again, no significant effect o f subjective probability of the 
outcome emerged, all other F<1.
DISCUSSION
The reported results provide first experimental evidence for the hypothesis that the 
affective valence o f an event and the resulting m ood state can influence causal 
thinking, independently o f the event’s expectedness. Negative events lead to intensified 
causal reasoning in com parison lo positive events of equal probability. The results of 
the manipulation checks dearly  dem onstrate that a confounding o f subjective 
probability and affective valence could be avoided in the present study. Therefore, 
affective valence seems to  be a predictor o f causal attributions in its own right. Thus, 
the need to explain negative events is not merely a subcategory of the need to  explain 
unexpected events.
On the other hand, no evidence for an increase in causal reasoning after unexpected 
events was obtained in the present study. One possible explanation for this unexpected
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finding is that the expectedness of the outcom e was not as im portant to subjects as its 
affective valence in this particular situation. In different types of situations, the relative 
impact o f  expectancy and valence on causal reasoning may be quite variable. 
Nevertheless, the manipulation check revealed a significant difference in subjects’ 
expectations between the high and low expectancy conditions, indicating the 
effectiveness of the present manipulation. Thus, it is safe to conclude that the observed 
effects o f affective valence were independent of subjective probability, despite a 
successful variation o f the latter variable.
Now that the influence of affective valence on causal reasoning has been 
demonstrated and disentangled from expectancy effects, the question arises, why 
persons in a negative mood are likely to generate m ore causal attributions than 
persons in a positive mood. In this regard, it is im portant to note parallel findings in 
other research areas tha t suggest pronounced influences of individuals' affective slate 
on inform ation processing. It has been dem onstrated, for example, that positive 
mood, as com pared to  neutral m ood, elicits simplified processing strategies and less 
systematic problem solving on complex judgm ental tasks (Isen el al., 1982). Similarly, 
persons in a negative mood were found to elaborate the arguments of a persuasive 
comm unication systematically, whereas persons in a positive mood did not engage in 
systematic processing. Accordingly, subjects in a depressed mood were more 
persuaded by strong than by weak arguments, whereas subjects in an elated mood 
were equally affected by both types of arguments in their cognitive responses as well as 
in their attitude change (Bless et al., 1988; W orth and Mackie, 1987). There are, at 
least, three possible explanations for the increase in causal and analytic reasoning 
under the influence of negative events and the resulting negative feeling slates.
First, an intensified search for causal explanations makes it more likely that 
external and self-irrelevant attributions for the event may be identified (Wyer and 
Carlston, 1979). Thereby the evaluation of the event and its consequences may change 
and the negative feelings associated with it may be reduced. Second, the increase of 
causal reasoning after a negative event may serve the purpose of preparing actions that 
are likely to elim inate the aversive state o r to avoid similar events in the future. In 
order to actively eliminate or avoid certain situations, a person must have reasonably 
accurate knowledge about their causation, i.e., he or she needs to  know what 
conditions are to be changed or avoided. A third explanation does not focus on the 
results o f  causal attributions, but on the process o f causal reasoning itself. Causal 
thinking itself may reduce the intensity of affective states (e.g. Speisman et al., 1964; 
Schwarz, 1987), This hypothesis is supported by the finding that thinking about 
pleasant or unpleasant past life events leads to  pronounced changes in affective states 
if it is vivid and concrete. If, on the other hand, thinking is focused on causal 
explanations for the event, changes in affect are not obtained (Strack et al., 1985, 
Experiment 3). Thus, causal thinking may serve for the control o f emotion.
Obviously, these process assumptions are not mutually exclusive. Which one is most 
applicable, and how far the different mechanisms may be intertwined, cannot be 
decided on the basis o f the availablcdata and awaits clarification by further research. 
The purpose o f the present study was to  disentangle the natural confounding of 
affective valence and subjective probability in a controlled experiment. The results 
suggest that affective valence by itself should be taken  into account as a determinant of 
causal attribution in its own right.
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RÉSUM É
Qu'est ce qui élicite l'attribution causalc: l'impact de la valence et des probabilités subjectives.
Plusieures études sur le terrain et des simulations expérimentales ont démontré que le 
raisonnement causal augmente après des événements inattendus aussi bien qu'après des 
événements désagréables. Cependant, des événements désagréables apparaissent moins 
probables dans la vie quotidienne que des événements agréables. De fait, la probabilité d'un 
événement et sa valeur hédonique étaient confondues de manière naturelle dans ces études. Pour 
isoler la contribution des deux facteurs, la probabilité subjective et la valence d'un événement 
étaient manipulées indépendamment dans une expérience de laboratoire. Les sujets ont répondu 
à un soi-disant 'test de savoir-faire professionel' et étaient informés de leur réussite ou de leur 
échec selon un critère établi par l'expérimentateur. La probabilité subjective de réussite a été 
manipulée en informant les sujets de la distribution des réussites et des échecs dans une 
population com parable (soit 23 per cent soit 77 per cent réussissaient le test). Les résultats 
indiquent un effet marqué de la valence: lorsque le sujet croyait avoir échoué, l'intensité du 
raisonnement causal était plus forte et les raisons avancées pour expliquer l’échec plus 
nombreuses que lorsque le sujet croyait avoir réussi, et cela indépendamment de la probabilité a 
priori de la réussite. Aucun effet du charactère attendu ou inattendu de l’événement sur 
l’explication causale a été trouvé. Plusieurs processus médiateurs sont discutés.
ZUSAM M ENFASSUNG
ln einer Reihe von Feldstudien und Simulaiionscxpenmcnten wurde gezeigt, daß sowohl 
erwartungsdiskrepante als auch negative Ereignisse das Ausmaß kausalen Nachdenkens 
erhöhen. Da im Alltag allerdings unangenehme Ereignisse für unwahrscheinlicher gehalten 
werden als angenehme, war somit die subjektive Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Ereignisses mit der 
durch die Valenz des Ereignisses ausgelösten Stimmung konfundiert. Um diese Konfundierung 
aufzulösen, wurden in einem Laborexperiment subjektive Erwartung und Valenz unabhängig 
voneinander variiert. Versuchspersonen bearbeiteten einen angeblichen Berufseignungstest und 
erhielten anschließend eine Erfolgs- oder Mißerfolgsrückmeldung, bezogen auf ein vom  
Versuchsleiter vorgegebenes Kriterium. Die subjektive Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit wurde 
variiert, indem den Versuchspersonen die Verteilung von Erfolg und Mißerfolg in der 
Population mitgeteilt wurde (*23 Prozent vs. 77 Prozent der Teilnehmer erreichen das 
Kriterium'). Die Ergebnisse zeigen einen ausgeprägten Effekt der Valenz: Sowohl die Intensität 
des kausalen Nachdenkens als auch die Anzahl der Ursachen für das Ergebnis, über die die 
Versuchspersonen nachdenken, ist nach negativer Rückmeldung größer als nach positiver. Die 
vorliegende Untersuchung bietet keine Evidenz für eine Zunahme kausalen Nachdenkens nach 
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